NEW ORLEANS – A Louisiana federal court has granted a motion for reconsideration and reopened a once-dismissed personal injury action, brought by a remote vehicle pilot who said he was assaulted by his superintendent nearly two years ago, while staying at a hotel in Guyana.
On Aug. 22, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana Judge Susie Morgan granted a motion for reconsideration from plaintiff Kyle Rak, in his lawsuit versus C-Innovation, L.L.C., Island Ventures 6, L.L.C. and Galliano Marine Services International, L.L.C.
“Plaintiff Kyle Rak alleges he sustained personal injuries in an incident that occurred at the SleepIn Hotel and Casino in Georgetown, Guyana, on Oct. 10, 2022, after his superintendent ‘suddenly, and without warning or provocation, assaulted and shoved [him] to the ground.’ At the time of the incident, Rak was employed as a pilot technician of Remotely Operated Vehicle systems by defendant C-I, a marine services company that provides ROV Systems and related services on vessels as a third-party contractor to clients in the oil and gas industry. During the 10-month tenure of his employment with C-I, Rak worked in Guyana aboard the ISLAND PERFORMER, a vessel owned by defendant Island Ventures. On Oct. 11, 2022, the day after the incident between Rak and his superintendent, C-I terminated Rak’s employment. On Feb. 17, 2023, Rak filed this action asserting claims under theories of negligence and unseaworthiness, for maintenance and cure, and for retaliatory discharge and wrongful termination. All of Rak’s claims are based on the premise that he was a seaman under the Jones Act at the time of his alleged injury,” Morgan said.
“On April 9, 2024, after the close of discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Rak’s claims fail as a matter of law because he was not a Jones Act seaman. The Court’s order and reasons issued on May 17, 2024, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of Rak’s claims, finding ‘the record reveals no evidence from which reasonable persons might draw the conclusion that plaintiff is a Jones Act seaman,’ and the Court entered final judgment in favor of the defendants and against Rak. In reaching that decision, the Court relied heavily on a Fifth Circuit opinion that rejected the seaman status of a plaintiff under ‘substantially similar’ facts to the instant case.”
In Santee v. Oceaneering International, Inc. (hereinafter, the “First Santee Decision”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined “an ROV [Systems] technician, employed by a land-based contractor that neither owned nor operated the vessel from which the plaintiff worked, failed to establish” Jones Act seaman status “even though he spent ‘nearly all’ of his employment with the vessel.”
As expressed in the May 17 order, this Court determined it was “bound to” apply the First Santee Decision to the facts of this case and, consequently, found “Rak’s connection to the ISLAND PERFORMER was not [sufficiently] substantial in nature” to satisfy the operative seaman status test.
Four days after this Court issued the May 17 order, the Fifth Circuit withdrew the First Santee Decision and granted a petition for panel rehearing. On June 13, 2024, Rak filed the instant motion urging the Court to reconsider its May 17 order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) in light of the “intervening change in law” affected by the Fifth Circuit’s withdrawal of the First Santee Decision.
On Aug. 7, the Fifth Circuit issued a corrected order and reasons in Santee (hereinafter, the “Second Santee Decision”) and the next day this Court granted Rak leave to supplement his motion for reconsideration in light of the Second Santee Decision.
In her analysis, Morgan found that the Second Santee Decision “represents an intervening change in controlling law that warrants reconsideration of the Court’s May 17 order granting summary judgment against plaintiff Rak.”
“The defendants correctly point out that a plaintiff need only show ‘at least some possibility of proving his Jones Act claims’ to remand a case to state court when their litigation adversary challenges the claims as ‘fraudulently pleaded.’ However, the defendants misstate the burden on summary judgment as requiring plaintiff Rak ‘to present competent evidence to affirmatively satisfy each of the Sanchez factors.’ In this case, Rak asserts claims under the Jones Act and therefore bears the burden of establishing his seaman status at trial,” Morgan said.
“The defendants moved for summary judgment on Rak’s seaman status ‘indicating an absence of evidence to support the elements of Rak’s Jones Act claims.’ As discussed in the May 17 order, when a movant seeks ‘summary judgment on the ground that the non-movant has no evidence to establish an essential element of the claim, the non-moving party may defeat a motion for summary judgment by ‘calling the Court’s attention to supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by the moving party.”
Morgan ultimately found that plaintiff Rak has sufficiently demonstrated that the motion to reconsider “is justified by an intervening change in the controlling law” upon which the Court based its May 17 order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and against Rak.
“Applying the First Santee Decision to the facts of this case, the Court found there was no genuine issue of material fact as to Rak’s seaman status. However, applying the Second Santee Decision to the facts of this case, Rak’s opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment raises genuine issues of material fact as to his seaman status. Because reasonable persons could draw conflicting inferences as to Rak’s seaman status, the issue is a question for the jury and the Court will vacate the May 17 order and final judgment,” Morgan stated.
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana case 2:23-cv-00619
From the Louisiana Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com